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Williams: Trends of Search and Seizure in Florida

TRENDS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN FLORIDA
G=n WmuIs *

The law on search and seizure comprises but a fraction of one volume of any set of general legal text. Many lawyers never encounter a
question on this subject in an entire legal career. Yet, it is a subject of
the utmost importance, not only in the law enforcement and criminal
law fields, but potentially in the life of any of our citizens, because it is
based upon one of the rights of the individual insisted upon by the
founders of our country.
Laymen and lawyers alike have difficulty in comprehending the
rulings of the courts in this field. Many misconceptions of the law of
search and seizure are present, misconceptions not only of the rulings,
but of the reasons for them.
No attempt will be made in this article to comprehensively cover
the entire subject of search and seizure, since that task could only be
accomplished by a much longer treatment. Instead, it will be confined to a brief summary of the basic concepts and development of the
law, comments on the present status, and an analysis of recent developments and trends. Matters that might be of practical benefit to the
lawyer will be stressed; matters of rare or academic interest will be
mainly forgone.
HISTORY AND DEVELOPmNT

The law on search and seizure is a heritage of our Anglo-Saxon
common law. During colonial times governmental representatives of
the British crown in the American colonies often ignored the legal
restrictions on searches and seizures. As a result, this was one of the
constitutional rights insisted upon by the fathers of our country, by
adoption of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,
and echoed in this state by section 22, Declaration of fights, Florida
Constitution.
From a practical standpoint search and seizure is important only
in a small number of cases. The great majority of criminal cases are
either cases against the person, such as the various forms of assault, or
crimes against someone's property, such as the various forms of burglary and larceny. In those instances, in addition to the state as the
"LL.B. 1939, University of Miami; Assistant State Attorney, 1953-1955; Judge,
Court of Crimes, 1955-1957; Judge, Criminal Court of Record, Dade County,

1957-present.
[180]
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nominal complaining party in the case, at least one person is the
alleged victim, generally called the complaining witness. The statement or testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient ground upon
which to make an arrest or obtain a search warrant in those few cases
where a search is necessary. It is only in a small group of cases, usually mala prohibitum and unknown at common law, where search
becomes necessary for a successful prosecution.
In cases such as gambling, illegal trafficking in liquor, abortions,
prostitution, and narcotics, to name the most common, there are usually no complaining witnesses. All persons involved are either principals or accessories in some degree. The crime is committed with
the consent of all those present. None of the persons concerned is
interested in calling the crime to the attention of law enforcement
officers. Hence, law enforcement officers, in order to apprehend violators of such laws, must obtain access to the places where the crimes
are being committed, either to catch the violators in the act, or to seize
illegal articles. In such cases the officers immediately encounter the
laws concerning search and seizure.
In the first seventy-five years that Florida was a state, very few
cases involving searches reached the Florida Supreme Court. The
scene changed, however, when the federal and Florida liquor prohibition laws were adopted in 1918. Hosts of inexperienced law enforcement officers were hurriedly employed to enforce those laws.
Many people opposed the prohibition laws. Such a resentment naturally increased the difficulties of enforcement, and had an effect upon
law enforcement officers, prosecutors, juries, and to some extent, upon
the courts. Raids were made by law enforcement officers upon homes,
automobiles, boats, and other premises to obtain evidence of illegal
manufacturing, selling, or possession of liquor. Immediately, cases
began to appear in the Supreme Court of Florida in which the constitutional provision on search and seizure was involved. Accordingly,
prohibition was responsible for the foundations of search and seizure.
After the Florida land "boom and bust" in the twenties, and during
the depression years of the thirties, both especially severe in the resort
areas of the state, many people embraced gambling as an aid to survival. Gambling was felt to be a necessity to attract tourists and to
induce them to leave some of their cash in Florida. Law enforcement
officers and other public officials tolerated the condition. The citizens
elected officials who had a "liberal" attitude on this subject. As time
went on, other forms of vice were attracted by this permissive climate.
Criminals came from other states to participate in gambling and other
illegal activities. Corruption inevitably developed in certain areas of
law enforcement as a result of having laws that could be enforced or
not at the will of the officers.
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When the depression ended, Florida's rapid population and economic growth obviated the "necessary evil" of widespread gambling.
The atmosphere changed. The public demanded stricter law enforcement. Violators of the gambling laws began to receive opposition in
the form of arrests and searches. Similar conditions prevailed in the
enforcement of liquor prohibition laws. Searches and seizures thus
became an issue in many criminal cases involving gambling and liquor.
Although the Florida and United States Prohibition Acts have been
repealed, Florida still allows dealings in liquor in accordance with
many restrictions, so that there remain many criminal cases involving
violations of the regulatory beverage laws. Thus, gambling and beverage violations constitute the bulk of cases involving the search and
seizure laws. Cases involving narcotics, prostitution, abortion, and
concealing stolen property are numerous, however, and occasionally a
search and seizure question may be involved in any type of criminal
case.
CONSTrMrIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

In Florida the law on search and seizure has stemmed directly
from section 22, of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, which is almost identical with the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Section 22 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches,
shall not be violated and no warrants issued, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place or places to be searched and the person or persons,
and thing or things to be seized.
The italics are by this writer, emphasizing two key phrases undefined by any constitutional or statutory provision. The courts have
assumed almost exclusive prerogative in the interpretation and application of these terms. At one time the Florida Supreme Court held
that this constitutional provision forbade the legislature to enact laws
that authorized unreasonable searches and seizures.' The court further held that what constituted a reasonable law authorizing search or
seizure was ultimately for judicial determination upon due consideration of the nature and extent of the evil designed to be remedied and
the provisions of the law. Later cases have held that the question of
whether a search is "reasonable" or "unreasonable" is to be resolved on
basis of the factual situation presented in each case, every situation to be tested by traditional requirements of judicial precedent as
1. Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 855, 91 So. 876 (1921).
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well as by legislative enactments established to implement the requirements of the constitution. 2 The legislature, however, cannot enact laws which negate the constitutional provision. The Supreme
Court of Florida has held unconstitutional a statute which authorized
officers having "good reason to believe that gambling is being carried
on in any house or other place" to enter it forcibly, if necessary, and
without written warrant.3
The constitutional provision has been implemented or modified in
certain areas. Florida Statutes 370.021(5) and 372.76 authorize the
search without warrants of vessels and buildings used by those engaged in the occupation of fishing. Sections 933.01 through 933.18 set
forth in detail the procedure for issuance, execution and return of
search warrants. Section 933.19 modifies the general rules on search
and seizure by specifying what constitutes reasonable searches of
motor vehicles. Section 901.21 authorizes searches of persons having
been validly arrested. Most of these statutes will be examined in
greater detail in ensuing sections of this article.
ExcIusioNAY R.=

During recent years a controversy has raged concerning the socalled "exclusionary rule"; that is, whether evidence secured as a result of an illegal search and seizure should be admitted into evidence
at trial. In Florida this controversy has been primarily generated by
the press and other laymen. Laymen had difficulty in understanding
why evidence against a defendant should not be produced in court
against him, regardless of how obtained, and argued that the fact the
search had uncovered incriminating evidence tended to prove that the
search was therefore reasonable. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected this argument, and held that the only way to insure that law
enforcement officers would respect their constitutional duty regarding
valid searches and seizures was to exclude evidence gained contrary
to the constitutional provision. 4 Florida has never wavered from this
path, although she was accompanied until recently only by the United
States Supreme Court and a small minority of her sister states.
The Constitution of Florida prohibits searches and seizures except
under certain circumstances, but does not provide a remedy for its
enforcement. Nor has the legislature implemented the constitution
in this regard. In fact, there does not appear to be a practicable way
to enforce it. Laws have been enacted to provide penalties for maliciously procuring the issuance of a search warrant,5 exceeding author2. Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1958).
3. Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (Fla. 1984).
4. Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 118 So. 704 (1927).
5. FLA. STAT. §933.16 (1961).
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ity in executing a search warrant, 6 and for other violations by officers,
but of course these, as other prohibitive or punitive statutes, are in the
hands of the same law enforcement officers who would usually be the
offenders. As stated by Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme
Court: "Though the police are honest and their aims worthy, history
guardians of the privacy which
shows that they are not appropriate
8
the Fourth Amendment protects."
Of course, there is theoretically a civil remedy, by way of trespass,
for persons whose premises have been invaded, or whose rights have
been wrongfully withheld, but the burden of prosecuting such actions
is on the persons injured. The difficulties of determining damages
and of collecting judgments would make such a remedy unsatisfactory
to the ordinary citizen. Therefore, the Florida courts have concluded
that excluding evidence improperly obtained by officers is the only
way to ensure the constitutional guarantee.

SEARCH WAYRANTS

At one time the great majority of cases involving search and seizure came before the courts on the question of the validity of the
search warrant, regarding such problems as issuance, execution, or
return. Many still think of search and seizure law as primarily concerning search warrants, but such is no longer true. However, cases
involving challenge to search warrants still do constitute a large portion of all cases involving section 22.
Because of the length of time that has entered into the development of the law concerning search warrants, and because the legislature has set forth in detail the proper procedure concerning the issuance and use of such writs, there has not here been as much change as
in some other areas of search and seizure law.
Chapter 933, Florida Statutes, sets out a detailed procedure concerning search warrants. No attempt will be made here to analyze all
of the sections. Some are so self-explanatory that there have been
few reported cases concerning them since they became law. The
subsequent discussion will be confined to a brief analysis of the search
warrant statutes and some of the more outstanding rulings in an effort
to identify possible trends in the course of the law. For clarity, some
attempt will be made to follow the same sequence of subject matter
as does the statute.

6. Ibid.
7. FLA. STAT. §933.19 (1961).

8. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273 (1960)
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Who May Issue
Section 933.01 provides that a search warrant may be issued by
any judge, including the judge of any circuit court, court of record,
criminal court of record, or by a county judge, justice of the peace, or
committing magistrate having jurisdiction within the district where
the place, vehicle or thing to be searched may be. Under this statute
it has been held that a justice of the peace of one district of a county
cannot issue a search warrant for premises in another district of the
same county, even though the justice of the peace of the proper district was unavailable. 9
In an interpretation of the phrase "any judge" as used in this section, the Florida Supreme Court has held it to mean only judges who
are committing magistrates as authorized in section 901.01 and that a
municipal judge therefore could not issue a search warrant.10 However, in most Florida municipalities this handicap has been alleviated
by charter amendments or by special acts of the legislature authorizing
municipal judges to issue search warrants in aid of prosecution for
violation of a municipal ordinance. Such an act has been approved
by the courts in Farragutv. City of Tampa."
Grounds Requisite for Issuance of Search Warrant
Section 933.02 sets forth the grounds upon which a search warrant
may be issued:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

For stolen or embezzled property
When property has been used
(a) As a means of committing any crime
(b) In connection with gambling
(c) In violation of obscene literature laws
When any property is possessed
(a) In violation of beverage laws
(b) In violation of fish and game laws
In violation of laws prohibiting cruelty to animals.
Grounds for Search of Dwelling

Subsequent by many years to enactment of section 933.02 the legislature enacted a statute prohibiting the search of a dwelling during
the night except for stolen or embezzled property. The present statute, little changed, is Florida Statute 933.18. Through this enactment
9. Robinson v. State, 124 So. 2d 714 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
10. Hart v. State, 89 Fla. 202, 103 So. 633 (1925).
11. 150 Fla. 107, 22 So. 2d 645 (1945).
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the sanctity of dwellings has been given special emphasis. In addition to this legislative pronouncement, the courts have been adamant
in refusing to yield ground in this regard. Constant reference is made
2
to such old Anglo-Saxon axioms as 'Every man's house is his castle."'
However, the rigid concept of sanctity of the dwelling has gradually
given way to the fulfillment of other policies. Section 933.18 eliminates the sanctity, not only in regard to concealment of stolen or embezzled property, but also as to violation of the laws on beverage,
gambling, narcotics, and frauds and swindles. In addition, the original prohibition regarding nighttime has been dropped. Thus, at least
a slight trend to relax the original strict limitations on search of dwellings is apparent.
Several decisions might indicate to the unwary that the same rules
applicable to searches of dwellings have been extended to searches of
other types of premises. This is not true in every respect. There is
probably more loose language and dicta in cases concerning search
and seizure than in any other area of criminal law. The courts simply
have not always taken sufficient care to restrict their rulings to the
question at issue. In several cases the courts have indicated that the
same protection that applies to dwellings is also accorded to offices,
stores, and warehouses, and other buildings. 13 Such an indication is
valid so far as applicability of section 22 of the Declaration of Rights
is concerned regarding "unreasonable searches," and "probable cause,"
but as to grounds for issuance of a search warrant, it is not. There can
be no question that grounds for issuance of a search warrant for a
dwelling are governed by section 933.18, and that issuance for all other
premises is ruled by section 933.02. Although enacted later, section
933.18 does not repeal or supersede section 933.02, but "must be so
construed as to give it effect consistent with such other sections and
4
part of sections and with the policy they indicate."1
Affidavit Requisite to Issuance of Search
Warrant
Section 933.04 reasserts the identical words of section 22 of the
Declaration of Rights. This reassertion is to eliminate any doubts as
to the self-executing nature of the constitutional provision. It is followed by sections 933.05 and 933.06, specifying that a search warrant
must be supported by an affidavit, sworn to and subscribed before a
judge or magistrate.
Section 923.11 sets forth the form for an affidavit approved by the
legislature. This form is misleading since it goes no further than sug12. E.g., Cooper v. State, 106 Fla. 254, 256, 148 So. 217 (1932).
13. E.g., Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934).
14. Johnson v. State, 27 So. 2d 276, 282 (Fla. 1946).
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gesting a bare statement that the afflant has "probable cause and
belief." It would be inadvisable to use this form except for the introductory statements, since practically identical affidavits have been
ruled by the courts to be insufficient.' 5 Sufficiency of the affidavit as
to probable cause will be discussed under a subsequent heading.
Description
Section 933.05 provides that the affidavit must name or describe
the person, place or thing to be searched, describing in particular the
property to be seized.
If the name of the occupant of the premises to be searched is
known, it should be supplied, but if not known, it is not required.' 6 It
was held in Jackson v. State17 to be insufficient to merely state "the
dwelling house of Freddie Jenkins in the County aforesaid and said
district aforesaid"' 8 where the county and district had been named, but
that it was not necessary to go so far as to give a legal description of
the location. It was sufficient to give the street address, city and
county,' 9 and also sufficient where the affidavit described the place as
that portion of premises occupied by named individuals in a certain
apartment house at a certain address, although the apartment was one
of twenty.2 0
The rule was laid down in the Jackson case that 2 '
[lit is a sufficient designation of the place to be searched if the
officer to whom the warrant is directed is enabled to locate the
same definitely and vith certainty. This does not necessarily
require the true legal description to be given in the form it appears on the records of the deed register. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others and on inquiry leads the officer unerringly
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.
A much-cited case which followed the rule laid down in the Jackson case is Bonner v. State.22 It was held there that the description of
premises to be searched as a certain dwelling located on a certain
street in Pensacola, Florida, was not insufficient, because the premises
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

E.g., Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924).
Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So. 2d 164 (1942).
Jackson v. State, supra note 15.
Id. at 266, 99 So. at 550.
Church v. State, supra note 16.
Seymore v. State, 110 So. 2d 460 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Jackson v. State, supra note 17, at 267, 99 So. at 550.
80 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1955).
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were actually located outside the city limits of Pensacola, only one
street existed such as the one designated, and no evidence was present
that the officers had the slightest difficulty in locating the address
described in the affidavit and warrant.
Regarding the objects to be seized, the rule was laid down in
North v. State2 3 that the phrase "particularly describing the property
or thing to be seized" must be given a reasonable interpretation24 consistent with the type or character of the property sought, and that
[W]here the purpose of the search is to find specific property,
it should be so particularly described as to preclude the possibility of seizing any other. On the other hand, if the purpose
be to seize, not specified property, but any property of a specified character, which, by reason of its character and of the place
where and the circumstances under which it may be found, if
found at all, would be illicit, a description, save as to such character, place, and circumstances, would be unnecessary and,
ordinarily, impossible ....
The court held that such phrases as "numerous slot machines, roulette wheels, and other gambling devices and games of chance such as
are commonly used in gambling games" 25r and "gambling implements
and devices used for the purpose of gaming and gambling" 26 are sufficient descriptions to satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirements.
Probable Cause for Issuance of Search Warrant
"Probable cause" as a requisite to issuance of a search warrant is
set forth in the constitutional provision. This provision is implemented
by statute to provide that the probable cause must be supported by
affidavit,2 7 and that the affidavit and further proof, if any, must set
forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application on
28
probable cause for believing that they exist.
No definition of "probable cause" has been formulated in the constitution or statutes, these words being left to the courts to define.
Even after rulings upon many particular affidavits and search warrants, it is not easy to say precisely what allegations are sufficient.
The courts have made it clear that such expressions as afflant "has
23. 159 Fla. 854, 32 So. 2d 915 (1947).
24. Id. at 857, 82 So. 2d at 917.
25. Id. at 856, 32 So. 2d at 917.

26. Ibid.
27. FLA. STAT. §933.05 (1961).
28. FLA. STAT. §933.05 (1961).
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probable cause to believe and does believe"29 or "has probable cause to
suspect and does suspect,"3 0 followed only by allegations in general of
a violation of law, are insufficient.
In the case of Carnagiov. State,3 ' the affidavit is set out verbatim in
the opinion of the court. One can picture an attorney or law enforcement officer, in a hurry to prepare an affidavit and search warrant,
turning to the index of the Florida Statutes, finding sections 923.11
and 923.12 which set out forms for affidavit and search warrant, and
copying the forms with the necessary substitutions for names and descriptions. After all, how could one go wrong in exactly following a
form specifically approved by the legislature? Woe to all who take
this path. This well-paved road leads only to frustration. It appears
that the Carnagioaffidavit and search warrant were prepared by this
easy, do-it-yourself method. These two statutes have never been directly ruled upon by the appellate courts. If the occasion arose, there
is little doubt that the statutes would be declared unconstitutional in
view of past rulings that the legislature cannot enact valid laws authorizing unreasonable searches. 32 Sections 923.11 and 923.12 should
either be repealed or amended, preventing future generations from
eagerly stepping into this innocent-appearing trap.
Many of the rulings on the sufficiency of affidavits regarding probable cause simply are to the effect that the particular affidavit before
the court either is sufficient or is not sufficient. Occasionally, however,
there is some comment which indicates that a few measurements have
developed that are somewhat more definite than the usual generalities. It has been held in Cooper v. State33 that there must be such an
allegation of fact that it could be traversed, and that it must be sufficient so that the afflant could be held accountable for false swearing
or perjury. Obviously, no one could be held accountable for perjury
for swearing that he "believed and had reason to believe," "suspected
and had reason to suspect," "had good reason to believe," or "had probable cause to believe."
It has also been said that the constitution "requires in substance
that a search warrant may issue only upon evidence that will lead a
man of prudence and caution to believe that the offense has been
committed." 34
In another case, the Florida Supreme Court said:3 5
29. Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 184, 113 So. 704 (1927).

30.
31.
82.
88.
34.
35.

Carnagio v. State, 106 Fla. 222, 228, 148 So. 164, 165 (1932).
Ibid.
Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 855, 91 So. 376 (1921).
106 Fla. 254, 143 So. 217 (1982).
Averill v. State, 52 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1951).
Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. 1950).
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The term "probable cause" has been defined as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.
On the weight entitled to be given to sworn allegations in an affidavit based upon statements made to afflant by a confidential informant, the First District Court of Appeal held in Harringtonv. State:3 6
The test is not whether the affiant should or should not rely on
the information provided by the informer, but simply whether
he did rely upon it and whether the circumstances stated by the
affidavit are reasonably sufficient to warrant the conclusion that
it is likely the law is being violated, not that the law actually has
been violated or that as a result of the search it will necessarily
be disclosed that a violation exists.
This holding should be accepted cautiously. It is difficult to reconcile
this case with the rule laid down in the Cooper case.37 For instance,
how could an affiant be held accountable for false swearing? The ruling in this case appears to have gone the furthest yet in favor of law
enforcement at the expense of the constitutional safeguard. On the
other hand, a recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Jones v. United States38 approved a similar affidavit. In the Jones case
the Court approved the issuance of a search warrant upon an affidavit
of an officer based on hearsay statements of a confidential informant,
rather than on direct observations of afflant officer, so long as the informant's statement was reasonably corroborated by other matters
within the officer's knowledge. The Court stated that it was sufficient
if informant's statements had only been corroborated in a few such
innocuous details as the description of defendant's appearance and
where he was on a given morning. Since the rulings by the Florida
courts have almost unanimously coincided with the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court on search and seizure questions, it may
be that the rulings in the Harrington(Florida) case and Jones (United
States) case now represent the law in Florida and the United States
on this question. However, these two late rulings seem to go so much
further in favor of law enforcement agencies than hosts of previous
cases. They should not be too heavily relied upon, yet.
Another word of caution is in order regarding the Jones case. We
have a case of a ruling made on the basis of a previous holding dealing
with somewhat different circumstances, thereby raising a possibility of
36. 110 So. 2d 495, 497 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
37. Cooper v. State, supra note 33.
38. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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the Court's having inadvertently applied the wrong principle of law.
In the Jones case the Court cited Draperv. United States39 as a precedent. However, in Draper the ruling was upon a search incident to
an arrest. No affidavit or search warrant was involved. If the intent
of the United States Supreme Court in the Jones case was to rule that
"probable cause" sufficient for issuance of a search warrant, and "probable cause" sufficient for the making of an arrest without a warrant, are
synonymous, then well and good. In so doing one possible inconsistency in search and seizure law will have been eliminated. Suffice it
to say here that past decisions have indicated that the courts have
been more rigid in the requirements for the issuance of search warrants than for making a valid arrest based upon probable cause.
Lest the writer appear critical of the rulings of the appellate courts,
let him explain that as a trial judge he has had the same experience
making a ruling on a search, based on what he thought to be wellconsidered deductions, only to discover too late that he had applied
the wrong principle. The sole purpose in pointing out possible contradictions in rulings is to impress upon lawyers and other interested
persons the importance of realizing that search and seizure law is far
more complex than is apparent at first glance. Actually, as in other
legal questions, the burden is rightfully on the attorneys for the respective parties to assure that the court, whether trial or appellate, is
made aware of all the law that seems appropriate, at least when there
appears to be a doubtful issue.
One of the outstanding examples of dictum, which appeared to be
stare decisis, concerned casual but positive statements by the Supreme
Courts of the United States and of Florida on the subject of acceptability of evidence in the determination of "probable cause" requisite
to issuance of a search warrant. These few words caused confusion
for years in the courts of Florida and in the federal courts as well.
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court, in Grau v. United
States,40 stated: "A search warrant may issue only upon evidence
which would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury.
. .,41
" The Florida Supreme Court, in the 1950 case of DeLany v.
City of Miami,42 adopted and quoted the foregoing expression of the
Grau case. Both courts immediately found themselves in the position
of appearing to have eliminated the use, in search warrant affidavits, of
hearsay, conclusions, and other evidence inadmissible at trial, but
which had for long been acceptable as forming "probable cause" as a
basis for issuance of search warrants.
39.
40.
41.
42.

358 U.S. 307 (1959).
287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932).
Ibid.
43 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1950).
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In the 1949 case of Brinegar v. United States, 43 the United States
Supreme Court repudiated the Grau case insofar as it had referred to
evidence inadmissible at trial as being unacceptable as basis for a
search warrant.
In 1955, the Florida Supreme Court in turn repudiated the expression it had made in the DeLancey case, and again cited the United
States Supreme Court's similar ruling in the Brinegar case. The Florida Supreme Court in Perez v. State said that its choice of words in
the DeLancey case had been "unfortunate and unnecessary."44
The problem was still not at an end. In 1957 a similar situation
came before the court in Chacon v. State.4 5 This case involved an affidavit which set forth that affiant officer listened on an extension telephone, saw an informant dial a certain telephone number, and heard
the informant purchase a lottery number. The telephone number was
identified as listed at a certain address described in the affidavit. The
first ruling and opinion of the court, in 1957, was to the effect that the
affidavit was based upon hearsay evidence, and therefore defective.
The court cited the old DeLancey case, making no mention of the
intervening case of Perez v. State.
On rehearing, the court sitting en bane some ten months later reversed its original ruling and stated: 40
In order that the matter may be conclusively settled once and
for all, we herewith announce again that the information forming the basis for a search warrant is not to be measured by its
admissibility as evidence in the trial of the case. In other
words, an officer may obtain information which would be adequate to support probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant even though if such information were subjected to the
technical rules of evidence applicable to the trial of the cause,
it would not be considered admissible.
It is to be hoped that this question is indeed settled. However, on
hearings upon motions to quash search warrants and to suppress evidence, attorneys still occasionally appear before the court earnestly
advocating the unequivocal ruling of the DeLancey case.
Confidential Informant
All cases involving confidential informants can be disposed of by
applying the principles of law applicable to each set of circumstances,
43.
44.
45.
46.

338 U.S. 160 (1949).
81 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1955).
102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 590.
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as was done in the foregoing discussion of probable cause.
An informant is any person who makes a statement to a law enforcement officer, prosecuting or judicial official, either orally or in
writing, officially or unofficially, formally or informally. The statement
may contain useful information or not.
A confidential informant is nothing more than an informant whose
identity is kept secret by the officer. The informant may be one who
gives information one time, or he may be a regular source of information to the officer. He may himself be at least in the fringes of illegal
activities, sometimes referred to as a "stool pigeon" in the parlance of
the underworld. On the other hand, he may be a law-abiding citizen
who wishes to give information to law enforcement officers, but who
does not want to be personally involved in any official action that
might be taken as the result of his information.
The danger of such information is that the informer may give exaggerated or even false information through prejudice, revenge, hope of
reward, or other subjective motives, knowing that the risk of discovery
is less than if he were to make a statement openly. The courts have
recognized, however, the necessity of leaving the door open to such
47
practice. In Harringtonv. State the court stated:
It is common knowledge that without the aid of confidential informants the discovery and prevention of crime would present
such a formidable task as practically to render hopeless the efforts of those charged with law enforcement. And the alarming
fact that the underworld often wreaks vengeance upon informers would unquestionably deter the giving of such information if
the identity of the informer should be required to be disclosed
in all instances.
All of these items are factors which courts are bound to consider in
weighing the credibility of any statement used in a court proceeding,
whether in the form of an affidavit, confession or testimony.
There is no doubt that there are strong reasons for proceeding with
caution in the treatment of statements of informers. When a person is
willing to make a statement only in secret, is unwilling to face the one
who may be affected by his statement, and is unwilling to submit to
hostile cross-examination, his statement is certainly weakened. If he
is willing to appear personally before a judicial officer and make his
statement under oath, such a statement would be entitled to more
weight. However, the latter still is not entitled to as much weight as
if the testimony were in a public trial, where the informant may be
thoroughly cross-examined in an effort to show bias, prejudice, de47. Supra note 86, at 497.
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meanor, means and opportunity of knowing the facts, and reasonableness and probability of his testimony. Each of these factors can be
judged by the courts in considering the weight to be given to a statement of a confidential informant or any other informant or witness.
Efforts have been made to force the State to name the confidential
informant or to produce him for examination upon his credibility and
upon the facts he allegedly divulged to officers. These efforts have
thus far been unsuccessful in Florida. The general rule is that, based
upon public policy, the identity of an informant who gives information
concerning the commission of a crime is privileged. 48 No reported
case in Florida has set out what circumstances might be exceptions to
the general rule; however, several cases have mentioned the decision
of the United States Supreme Court4 9 which has indicated that the
court may force disclosure of the informant in some situations. A
reading of this Supreme Court case discloses (1) that the informant's
allegations were not the basis for a search or seizure, or search warrant, (2) that there was no search and seizure, and (3) that the informant participated in the transaction which was the basis of the
criminal charge, and therefore was a material witness at the trial and
the preparation of the defense of entrapment. These factors are entirely lacking in all but a rare search and seizure case, and are not
analogous whatsoever to a case involving an affidavit for search
warrant.
Credibility of Afflant
As usual, a contest exists between the defense and law enforcement agencies in this area. Many enforcement departments have
adopted a practice of employing persons to seek out places that are
dealing in illegal activities. In many instances the undercover agent
is able to make purchases of illegal beverages, lottery tickets, and
other contraband. Instead of the enforcement officer making affidavit
for a search warrant, the undercover agent is brought before a magistrate, makes affidavit, and a warrant thereupon is issued if the magistrate finds probable cause in the affidavit or testimony.
The contention has recently been made by the defense that on a
motion to suppress the evidence for an invalid affidavit and search
warrant, the State should be forced to submit the afflant for examination for credibility. This proposal is resisted by the State because it
would result in disclosure of the identity of the undercover agent to
48. E.g., Garcia v. State, 110 So. 2d 709 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Byers v.
State, 109 So. 2d 882 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); State v. Hardy, 114 So. 2d 844
(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
49. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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persons engaged in criminal activities, especially organized criminal
activities, and the undercover agent would be rendered useless.
Conversely, the defense argues that if there is no method to attack
the credibility of the affiant, the way is opened for unscrupulous officers and undercover agents to falsify an affidavit and thereby circumvent the constitutional guaranty of the fourth amendment. Both arguments have merit. If the defense argument is valid, the defense
should be accorded the benefit of attacking the credibility of the affiant, since we have seen that the constitutional right has precedence
over the law enforcement functions of the state.
Florida Statute 933.06 provides:
The judge or magistrate must, before issuing the warrant, have
the application of some person for said warrant duly sworn to
and subscribed, and may receive further testimony from witnesses or supporting affidavits, or dispositions in writing, to support the application. The affidavit and further proof, if same
be had or required, must set forth the facts tending to establish
the grounds of the application or probable cause for believing
that they exist.
A provision missed by many is that in addition to a sworn affidavit by
some person, the judge or magistrate may receive additional testimony
or affidavits.5 0 It appears that this section does not contemplate a
casual issuance of a search warrant upon any affidavit, but rather a
proceeding which may be expanded until the judge or magistrate is
satisfied that probable cause exists.
The question was apparently first discussed in Florida in the case
of Joyner v. City of Lakeland, in which the Florida Supreme Court
stated: 51
Certainly, if the magistrate has reason to doubt the credibility
of the witness, no warrant should issue. Therefore, implicit in
the very issuance of a warrant is a finding by the issuing magistrate that the proof was furnished by a credible witness. We
see no reason to require more than this, and the legislature apparently did not.
In Byers v. State52 it was held that there is no authority for the claim of
right to require the state to produce the afflant to inquire into his
credibility.
A directly opposite ruling was recently announced by the Third
50. North v. State, 159 Fla. 854, 32 So. 2d 915 (1947).
51. 90 So. 2d 118, 122 (Fla. 1956).
52. 109 So. 2d 382 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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District Court of Appeal in Baker v. State." In that case, the trial
court, as in the Byers case, refused to quash an affidavit and search
warrant, and refused to force production of the affiant on motion of
the defense for bill of particulars. The appellate court, introducing
for the first time another concept to be applied to search and seizure
law, reversed the trial court. The court based its decision on two
reasons.

First, the court relied upon the principle that one accused of crime
is entitled to be confronted by his accuser, citing the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution and section 11, Declaration of Bights
of the Florida constitution. This case seems to be one of the few to
apply this particular concept to search and seizure questions. The
Baker case may well be the last word on the subject; however, at this
time the issue is in doubt. It would be well for the State to appeal
such cases to the Supreme Court of Florida for purposes of guidance
to the trial courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys. It would seem
that the State would have good grounds to induce the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari, since the Baker case is not only directly contrary to
a ruling of another District Court of Appeal (the Byers case),5 4 but
may be contrary to a ruling of the Florida Supreme Court in the Joyner case. In the Joyner case, 5 however, the expression by the court
was more general, and therefore could be more easily qualified. In all
probability, this question will finally have to be settled by the Supreme
Court.
Secondly, although recognizing past decisions in this state holding
that the prosecution may not always be required to reveal the name of
a confidential informant, "to expand the rule protecting 'confidential
informant' to protect one who actually executes an affidavit in accordance with section 933.18 . . . would do violence to the provisions of
the Federal and State Constitutions previously referred to." 0 The
court did not further explain its reasoning as to why such "would do
violence to the provisions" of the constitutions. It is difficult to follow
the reasoning. It was conceded by the court that it is valid to accept
an affidavit based on the unsworn statement to affiant by an undisclosed informant, known only to affiant, who is thus the sole arbiter of
the credibility of the informant. Why should a greater suspicion be
thrown on an affiant who comes before a magistrate in person, discloses his identity to the magistrate, is sworn by the magistrate, and is
available to examination conducted by the magistrate? Is the magistrate less able to judge the credibility of the informant under oath
53.
54.
55.
56.

150 So. 2d 729 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
Byers v. State, supra note 52.
Joyner v. State, supra note 51.
Baker v. State, supra note 53, at 730.
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than is the officer upon the unsworn statement of an informer who is
known only to the officer? Is the magistrate less to be trusted to do
his duty as directed in section 933.06 than the grand jury or prosecuting attorney in deciding the credibility of persons upon whose testimony indictments and informations are based?
Formal Requisites of Warrant, Execution and Return
The manner in which search warrants are to be issued, executed
and returned is concisely set out in Chapter 933 of the Florida Statutes. Generally, the courts have held that this chapter must be strictly
followed.5 7 A warrant not issued in duplicate as directed by the statute is null and void. 58 However, on matters not set forth in the statutes quite so specifically, the courts have shown some flexibility.
Although the statute provides that the warrant shall direct that the
search warrant be served "forthwith,"59 a lapse of eight days between
issuance and execution was not excessive and was within the discretion of the issuing judge6 0 Florida Statute 933.12 requires that an
inventory of all property taken under a warrant be attached to the
warrant and be verified by a sworn affidavit. The court in this same
case concluded that the omission of this affidavit did not make the
warrant defective. The court held finally that the preparation of the
return is merely a ministerial act and that a defect therein does not
make the warrant defective.
The procedure to be followed in executing the search warrant
sometimes raises questions, but there is a paucity of judicial rulings in
Florida. Sections 933.09 and 933.11 set forth the requirements. These
sections, however, appear to contemplate execution upon peaceful,
law-abiding persons. To fulfill the requirements of the statute literally, the executing officer would knock on the door, wait for it to be
opened, identify himself, read the warrant to the person at the door,
hand that person a copy of the warrant, and then search the premises.
In actual practice the officer often knocks on the door, announces his
official capacity and purpose, waits a few seconds, and if the door is
not immediately opened, breaks it open. If he sees that evidence is
being destroyed or persons are attempting to escape, he first secures
the premises, then carries out the remaining requirements, knowing
at the beginning that if he does not get into the premises immediately
that all the moonshine will go down the kitchen sink and all the lottery
tickets down the bathroom commode. Although the statute definitely
57. E.g., Pell v. State, 97 Fla. 650, 122 So. 110 (1929).

STAT. §933.11 (1961); Pell v. State, supra note 57.
59. FLA. STAT. §933.07 (1961).
60. Joyner v. City of Lakeland, 90 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1956).

58. See FLA.
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requires certain steps to be taken, the State should not be penalized if
the executing officers are prevented from strictly following such steps
because of the actions of the occupants of the premises.
On the other hand, there would seem to be no just cause why the
officer should not fulfill all requirements possible, even though some
steps might have to be taken after the search and arrests, If any, and
after the excitement has subsided. The occupants are entitled to be
supplied with information that enables them to prepare a defense, and
the mandate of the legislature should be complied with to the fullest
extent possible.
REAsoxrztL

SEARCHS AND SEIZ-UE

WrrmouT SEARCH WARAtr

In reading the cases on search and seizure, it appears that practically all early cases involved the question of search warrants. Only
two questions were considered. First, was the search by search warrant? If determined that the search was without warrant, the evidence was suppressed. If determined that the search was by search
warrant, the second question was whether the warrant was properly
issued. The only exception noted was that of a search incident to a
valid arrest. 61
Over a period of time, however, the exceptions have almost become the rule. Although cases involving search warrants still constitute a substantial number of the cases involving search and seizure
law, the cases involving searches made without a warrant outnumber
those in which the search was made by virtue of a warrant. In the
beginning, all emphasis was placed upon that part of section 22, Declaration of Rights, which mentioned warrants. Later, the term "unreasonable searches" received equal attention, and all exceptions to the
old general rule have been built upon that phrase.
The question of "reasonableness" or "unreasonableness" of a search
is to be resolved on the basis of the factual situation presented in each
case, and every situation is to be tested by traditional requirements of
judicial precedent as well as by legislative enactments established to
62
implement the requirements of the constitution.
Incident to Valid Arrest
A search incident to a valid arrest was the first concept approved
by the courts as a reasonable search without a search warrant. The
most common instances of valid arrest are listed here, with little attempt at discussion in detail. Most are provided for explicitly by
statute.
61. Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 855, 91 So. 376 (1921).
62. Chaeon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1958).
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A. Arrest with warrant 63
64
B. Arrest by peace officer without warrant
(1) When the person to be arrested has committed a felony
or misdemeanor in his presence
(2) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe the person to be arrested
has committed it
(3) When he has reasonable ground to believe that a felony
has been or is being committed and reasonable ground
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or
is committing it
(4) When a warrant has been issued charging any criminal
offense and has been placed in the hands of any peace
officer for execution
C. A private citizen has the right to arrest a person who commits
a felony in his presence, or to arrest a person when a felony
has been committed, and when the arresting citizen has probable cause to believe, and does believe, the person arrested to
be guilty.65
Violations of municipal ordinances have been classified as misdemeanors, and arrests without a warrant are prohibited if the offense
does not occur in the presence of an officer. 6 6 Municipal officers are
prohibited from making arrests outside the municipal boundaries unless the arrest conforms to the common-law rule of arrest by a private
67
citizen.
Whether an arrest is valid in order to support an incidental search
is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined advisedly by the
court.68
It has been ruled that the phrase "reasonable grounds to believe,"
as used in the statutes defining lawful arrest, is synonymous with
"probable cause,"69 and the courts use these terms interchangeably.
The type of premises searched might seem to have some effect
upon the rulings on searches incident to arrest, but after analysis, the
principles appear to be the same. The great majority of reported
cases on this subject involve automobiles. Reasons for this are that
automobiles are out in the open, readily observed by officers, and that
by the very nature of our modem traffic conditions, drivers of auto63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

FLA. STAT.

§§901.02-.08 (1961).

FLA. STAT. §901.15 (1961).

Collins v. State, 148 So. 2d 700, 703 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
Campbell v. County of Dade, 113 So. 2d 708 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Collins v. State, supra note 65.
Urso v. State, 134 So. 2d 810 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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mobiles are subject to a wide variety of regulatory traffic and inspection
laws.
The reason that there is seldom a reported case on search of a person incident to a valid arrest probably is that this is so explicitly covered by statute. 70 No limit is set by statute regarding the extent of a
search of the person under arrest.
So few reported cases of searches of dwellings and other buildings
incident to a valid arrest are in existence that some might believe such
a search to be impossible without a warrant, particularly in view of the
utmost sanctity of the home. This sanctity has been extended to
places of business. 71 Although the situations are unusual, there are
cases that hold it reasonable to search a dwelling or other fixed premises incident to a valid arrest and -without a search warrant. The
writer had occasion to preside over a trial in which the testimony of
arresting officers was to the effect that they had kept defendants under
surveillance for a long period of time, believing them to be engaged in
operation of a lottery; that on certain evenings the defendants would
meet for an hour or so, on each occasion at a different dwelling house;
that on the occasion in question the officers were able to see into the
lighted interior of the house from the public walk and see lottery
paraphernalia and the defendants operating adding machines and
counting money. The officers knew from their previous constant surveillance that by the time they could obtain a search warrant the
defendants would be gone. Observing that a crime was being committed before their eyes, they entered the dwelling, arrested the defendants and seized the illegal articles. The motion to suppress the
evidence was denied, the defendants were convicted, and the conviction was affirmed. 72 Admittedly, the case is weakened for use as a
precedent because the appellate court rendered only a per curiam
opinion, and the Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari without
opinion. It is interesting to note, however, that in Carrollv. United
States,73 to be discussed more fully in the section on motor vehicles,
the United States Supreme Court distinguished between a search of a
store, dwelling house, or other structure, in respect of which a proper
official warrant may be readily obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant.74 The same reasoning can easily be applied to circumstances such as in this case, where the defendants
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

FLA. STAT. §901.21 (1961).

Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934).
Giliespie v. State, 108 So. 2d 654 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
See Miller v. State, 137 So. 2d 21 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
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deliberately moved their operations from place to place rapidly, remaining in one dwelling only a limited length of time.
One of the questions that has arisen is the extent to which an officer can go in searching incident to an arrest. On arrest for a traffic
violation, during which arrest bolita tickets were seen on the seat, it
was held permissible to further search the car.75 However, the search
of the trunk of a car is not properly incident to an arrest for driving
76
while intoxicated.
If there is a trend in this segment of search and seizure law, it is
toward a less strict ruling on what constitutes a valid arrest upon
which a search may be predicated. Exemplary of this trend is a 1959
decision of the First District Court of Appeal, 77 in which a rather complicated set of circumstances was involved. The arresting officer first
noticed defendants in St. Augustine because of their unshaven and
unkempt appearance. Later the same day the officer again saw the
defendants outside the city and decided to "check them out" Up to
this point there was nothing but the unkempt appearance prompting
the officer. No traffic violation or other unlawful activity had taken
place. The officer stopped the defendants and checked the driver's
Wisconsin operator's license, which appeared to be in order. The officer requested examination of the registration card of the automobile,
the driver responding that Wisconsin did not issue such a document.
The officer then noticed that the radio and heater were missing from
the automobile. Defendants stated that they had been pawned. The
officer radioed his headquarters to inquire whether there was any
information there concerning the automobile or defendants, and received a negative response. Nevertheless, the officer arrested defendants. A subsequent search of the automobile revealed property that
had been taken in a robbery in Florida. The court ruled that the
officer had probable cause, at the time of arrest, to believe that they
were committing a crime in his presence, specifically, theft of the
automobile in which they were riding.
In view of many other previous cases, it would at first appear that
the court was going extremely far in finding probable cause. However, there are a number of recent cases of the Supreme Courts of the
United States and Florida that also evidence greater liberality than
formerly in the treatment of circumstances constituting "probable
cause."78
75.
76.
77.
78.
States,

State v. Simmons, 85 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1956).
Courington v. State, 74 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
E.g., Jones v. United States, 862 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United
358 U.S. 807 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 838 U.S. 160 (1949).
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In considering this subject, it is apparent that one of the problems
is the defining of "probable cause" in definite terms that can be used
as measuring guides. As with other intangible legal concepts, it is
almost impossible to explain the phrase in more definite language than
the phrase itself. One of the best discussions of "probable cause in
simple language is the following:" 9
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must
be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "isa
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.". . . [Court's citations
omitted.] And this "means less than evidence which would
justify condemnation" or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for
the Court more than a century ago . . . .Since Marshall's time,
at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed....
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from
rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway
for enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because
many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must
be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause
is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often
opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law
enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.
There seems no better way to sum up this subject.

79. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
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Motor Vehicles
Laws often seem to be too conservative, too difficult to change.
It is therefore very gratifying to those of us who have faith in our system of law to be able to point out instances which illustrate the growth
of our law to logically fit the growth of our state, nation and civilization. One such example is the development of the search and seizure
law to apply to automobiles and other motor vehicles which were
unknown at the time the Florida and United States Constitutions
were adopted.
The coming into general use of the automobile was approximately
coincident with the enactment of the Florida and United States Prohibition Acts. The automobile provided an ideal means for the distribution of illegal beverages to all parts of the country. Prior to the
invention and development of the automobile almost all freight was
carried by railroads and other common carriers, which were not practicable for the wholesale carrying of contraband.
It became immediately obvious that when an automobile was being used to transport contraband, it was almost always impossible to
secure the issuance and execution of a search warrant upon such vehicle because of its capability of rapid and unpredictable movement.
In 1925 the United States Supreme Court rendered a landmark
opinion regarding search and seizure of motor vehicles, Carroll v.
United States.80 Uniquely, the Florida legislature adopted as statutory law the provisions of the Court's opinion in that case. 8 ' The
statute provides that the same rules of admissibility of evidence and
liability of officers for illegal or unreasonable searches and seizures as
were laid down in the Carroll case should apply to and govern the
rights, duties and liabilities of officers and citizens in Florida under
the provisions of the Florida constitution relating to searches and
seizures.
The question involved in the Carroll case was the admissibility
into evidence of contraband liquor, seized as a result of the interception of a moving automobile and the search thereof, without a search
warrant. Federal officers, accompanied by a state officer, arrested the
defendants for violation of the National Prohibition Act. The search
was not made during a surveillance where any illegal acts were observed by the officers. The automobile was encountered by chance.
The search was made on the basis of deductions made by the officers
from facts known to them concerning the defendants and their automobile, together with their direction of travel. The Court cited several early laws, particularly statutes enacted by the First Congress in
80. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
81. FLA. STAT. §938.19 (1961).
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1789. All of the cited statutes recognized a difference between the
necessity for a search warrant for contraband concealed in a dwelling
house or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a movable vessel where they could be put out of reach
of a search warrant.
The Court, having found that contraband goods illegally transported in a vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, then considered under what circumstances such search may be made. The
conclusion was that such a search could be made upon "probable
cause," or,

82

This is to say that the facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being
transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched.
Care must be taken not to be misled into believing that the ruling
was based upon the concept of search incident to arrest. Many have
misconceptions on this point. If this were true, the validity of the
search in each instance would rest upon whether illegal transportation
were a felony or misdemeanor. The Court in the Carroll case went
was not based upon the conout of its way to point out that its ruling
83
arrest:
an
to
incident
cept of a search
The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents
of the automobile offend against the law. The seizure in such
proceeding comes before the arrest ....
That admonition is often overlooked in cases involving automobiles, probably because many searches and seizures of automobiles
actually are incident to a valid arrest. Many times elements of both
are present, so that the search is valid under either concept, especially
if a felony is involved. A good example in Florida of the concept
approved in the Carroll case is that of Longo v. State. 4 Officers in
the Longo case had been informed that a liquor-store employee would
be transporting lottery tickets on a specified route at a certain hour in
an automobile of named make, color, and model. This first employee
escaped the officers. However, the police, acting upon information to
the same effect concerning another employee of the liquor store, who,
when he saw the officers, accelerated his speed, apprehended him
82. Carroll v. United States, supra note 80, at 162.

83. Id. at 159.
84. 26 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1946).
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after a two-mile chase. The Florida Supreme Court held that this
constituted reasonable cause for belief that the employee illegally possessed lottery tickets, and justified search and seizure. There were not
reasonable grounds to believe that a felony was being committed, so
the search could not have been justified as incident to a valid arrest.
In Miller v. State 5 an officer appeared on the accident scene and
observed in defendant's glove compartment a large amount of money
and adding machine tapes. He took these into custody, and sent the
defendant, who was injured, to a hospital. Defendant's car was then
towed to a garage and impounded. The officer then went to the
hospital and placed defendant under arrest for a traffic violation, a
misdemeanor. Later the car was searched and evidence of lottery
was found. The court held that the arrest for misdemeanor was not
valid since the offense had not occurred in the presence of the officer
as required by statute.86 The next question was whether the officer
had probable cause to believe that the automobile was illegally transporting contraband, thereby qualifying under the Carroll case and
section 933.19. The court held in the negative, pointing out that a
search on that theory, even under the Carroll case, was valid only
where it is not practicableto secure a warrant.
The trend is to narrow the concept of immunity against searches
7
and seizures when automobiles are involved.
Standing of Defendant to Invoke Privilege
One of the first cases in Florida on this subject; and considered for
many years the leading one, was Church v. State.8 8 The court there
stated that a search was not unreasonable where the defendants did
not allege or prove that the premises searched was their dwelling, or
that they owned, rented or were in possession of it. Thus, they had no
standing to invoke the rule against unreasonable search and seizure.
This became known as the "proprietary interest rule," and was not
seriously questioned until recently. It has been held that persons in
premises only as invitees, guests or associates of the owner or occupant could not complain of a search, even if the search would have
been invalid had they been the owner or occupant.8 9 Guest passengers in an automobile have been treated similarly.90
This proprietary interest rule remained unmodified until very re85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

137 So. 2d 21 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
(1961).
Cameron v. State, supra note 77.
151 Fla. 24, 9 So. 2d 164 (1942).
Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1958).
Cispert v. State, 118 So. 2d 596 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
FLA.STAT. §901.15
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cently. In the 1962 case of Leveson v. State,9 1 by a split decision in
which even the majority of two judges did not agree on the reason, the
Third District Court of Appeal seemed to expand the immunity rule
beyond the scope of all former cases, although the holding was not
actually in conflict with any prior case. Defendant had set his girlfriend up in an apartment, although he had a home and wife elsewhere. Defendant paid the rent for the apartment, but there was a
lease in writing naming the girl as lessee. He stayed at the apartment
occasionally, had clothes and other items there, and possessed a key.
The majority decision by two judges was that defendant had standing
to protest an invalid search warrant. One of the two judges based his
decision on the United States Supreme Court decision in Jones v.
United States.9 2 The other judge was of the opinion that defendant
had sufficient right in the apartment to come within the rule in Florida.
On the State's petition for certiorari, the Florida Supreme Court
agreed with the ruling of the District Court of Appeal, 93 but specified
that its decision was not based upon the Jones case. The court ruled
that defendant was actually in possession of the property, that he
enjoyed complete and unrestricted access to the apartment and occupied it at will for substantial periods of time. The court placed Leveson within the same class as the Church case. However, the court
differentiated Church and Leveson from cases in which mere guests
or licensees were involved. The court stated that such guests or invitees still have no standing in Florida.
The reason that the Jones case became such an issue in the Leveson case is that the United States Supreme Court in the Jones case
went all the way in removing "proprietary interest" as a requisite to
standing of a defendant to invoke the constitutional privilege.
It is now unequivocally the federal rule that the Government,
when it chooses to use seized articles against a defendant in a prosecution for a criminal offense in which possession of such said articles is
an element, must admit thereby that defendant has standing to challenge the validity of the search and seizure. This ruling, on both
questions, is contrary to all Florida decisions.
Consent or Waiver
The development of the law of search and seizure has created
another exception to the general rule that searches are invalid in the
absence of search warrant, such exception being that of searches with
91. 138 So. 2d 361 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
92. Supra note 78.
93. State v. Leveson, 151 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1963).
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the consent of the defendant 94 In other words, the courts have ruled
that the constitutional provision is a personal right or privilege. It has
generally been held that waiver can only be by the one whose rights
are involved.9 5 The waiver need not be in writing.96 It has been held
that a wife cannot waive the right for an absent husband, 97 but may if
the husband has previously consented. However, it has been held
that the right may be waived by a father for an absent son,98 that a
man's right may be waived by his mistress, 99 or by his mother.10 0
The approval of waiver of the right covers a range of circumstances
from an instance where defendant practically challenged officers to
find something if they could 10 ' to a situation where defendant, being
stopped by an officer for a defective taillight and asked by the officer
if he would mind an examination of the interior of the truck, stated
that he had no objection. 0 2 In order for the right to be waived, the
evidence thereof must be clear and convincing. 10 3 Where arresting
officers identified themselves as officers and freely displayed their
guns, submission of persons to arrest and search without resistance or
objection was not a waiver of constitutional rights. 10 4 Where officers
executing a search warrant told defendant that they had a warrant to
search the entire premises, but in fact the warrant only authorized
search of defendant's store and not of defendant's adjoining dwelling,
the fact that defendant told officers to go ahead with the search did
not waive defendant's constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches of the home.'0 5 The fact that defendant is under
arrest at the time consent is given does not in itself negate the consent.' 0
In practice, the testimony is usually in sharp conflict between defendant and officers. Usually the appellate courts do not disturb the
trial court's authority to decide the issue, even if it amounts to dis07
crediting the defendant's testimony in its entirety.1

94. James v. State, 80 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1955).
95. Tribue v. State, 106 So. 2d 630 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
96. Jackson v. State, 132 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1961).
97. Carlton v. State, 111 Fla. 777, 149 So. 767 (1933).
98. Tomlinson v. State, 129 Fla. 658, 176 So. 548 (1937).
99. Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1962).
100. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1958).
101. Cant v. State, 114 Fla. 23, 152 So. 710 (1934).
102. Self v. State, 98 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1957).
103. Sagonias v. State, 89 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1956).
104. Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1953).
105. Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1950).
106. Rinehart v. State, 114 So. 2d 487 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
107. Slater v. State, 90 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1956).
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Incident to Exercise of State Regulatory Powers
This subject is a recent development in the law of search and seizure because of the relative newness of widespread state regulatory
powers. So far as searches and seizures from which criminal prosecutions have resulted are concerned, the most important areas here are
(1) beverage regulations and (2) motor vehicle operator's licenses.
Sections 561.07 and 562.031 constitute an outstanding exception to
the general law on search and seizure. By section 561.07 the legislature authorized employees of the Florida Beverage Department to
have access to and the right to inspect the premises of all licensees
under the beverage law and cigarette law; to collect taxes; to examine
books and records of all licenses under those laws; and to utilize deputy sheriffs in the enforcement of the beverage and cigarette laws.
Section 562.031 provides that beverage licensees agree that their
places of business shall always be subject to inspection and search
without warrants by the authorized employees of the beverage department and also by sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, and police officers during
business hours or at any time such premises are occupied by the licensee or other persons. The constitutionality of both of these statutes
has been unsuccessfully attacked. 10 8 Although these statutes appear to
negate the constitutional provisions of the necessity for a search warrant issued upon probable cause, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the statutes were not unreasonable. As a basis for upholding this
exception to former general rulings, the court stated that engaging in
the business of selling intoxicating beverages is not a vested right, but
a privilege subject to certain conditions. 10 9
Every motor vehicle operator in Florida is required to have his
operator's license on his person at all times when operating a vehicle
and to display said license upon demand to any officer or state employee enumerated in the statute." 0 The constitutionality of this statute has been upheld, the Supreme Court of Florida holding that the
operation of a motor vehicle is not a right, but a privilege, subject to
reasonable regulations."" It further held that police could operate a
roadblock or similar system for the purpose of checking automobile
2
drivers' licenses, this not amounting to an illegal search and seizure."
The court took judicial notice that the statute originally was enacted
as a source of revenue, but that in time it had become an essential segment of our laws for the control and prevention of traffic accidents.
108. Boynton v. State, supra note 104.

109. Ibid.

110.

FLA. STAT.

§822.15 (1961).

111. Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1958).
112. City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959).
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When a highway patrolman in making a check of a driver's license
has reason to believe that a crime is being committed in his presence,
there is lawful basis for an arrest and a search and seizure of the automobile for evidence relating to the crime. The officer's motive for
acting under the drivers' license statute is immaterial, and the fact that
he is suspicious that the driver of a particular automobile may be committing a crime does not affect his authority to stop the automobile
and check the driver's license1 1 3
In 1936 it was held that an insurance agent can be compelled to
produce records for inspection, under requirements of a statute that
4
was then in effect."
There are other state regulatory powers, such as regulations of
health," 5r hotels,"16 restaurants," i 7 and sale of cigarettes," 8 but these
have had little application to search and seizure in reported cases. It
would seem that rulings would be based on the same grounds as in the
preceding three examples.
Other Reasonable Searches
We have discussed the types of cases that constitute the majority
of instances of valid searches and seizures without warrant. A few
other isolated instances of special circumstances have been approved
by the courts.
In one case it appeared that the search and seizure took place in
some quasi-public place, not defined in the opinion, but apparently
some sort of store, privately owned, but into which the public was
invited. Officers walked into the public part of the premises and
observed defendant with lottery tickets at a desk, which the officers
were able to reach. It was held that this was a reasonable search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, where the officers were able to
reach the desk without going through doors, nor over or around any
obstruction." 9
It has been held that articles seized by federal officers by virtue of
a valid federal search warrant can be
used in prosecutions in Florida
20
courts for violations of Florida laws.

Where a person throws away articles during a surveillance by officers, suspecting that the officers might arrest and search him, and the
113. Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
114. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Knott, 123 Fla. 295, 166 So. 835 (1936).
115. FLA.STAT. ch. 381 (1961).
116. FLA.STAT.ch. 509 (1961).
117. Ibid.
118. FLA. STAT.ch. 210 (1961).
119. Victor v. State, 141 Fla. 508, 193 So. 762 (1939).
120. Reddick v. State, 104 So. 2d 413 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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officers pick up said articles on property in which 2defendant
has no
1
interest, such seizure has been held to be reasonable.'
PROCEDURE

Neither the Florida Constitution nor any statute sets forth the procedure to be used in invoking the protection of section 22 or of the
implementing statutes. As in most other areas concerning search and
seizure law, the procedure has been developed purely by judicial
direction.
Procedural Remedies
If a search warrant is involved, two alternative attacks are available: (1) a motion to quash the affidavit, search warrant, execution or
return, said motion directed to the magistrate who issued the warrant,
22
or (2) a motion to suppress the evidence, directed to the trial court'
The first remedy is seldom used, possibly because by the time the
search is questioned, the case is before the trial court. Additionally,
the judges who issue the warrants are reluctant to rule on validity of
search warrants they have previously issued.
Improper Remedies
Some lawyers still attempt to attack the validity of a search and
seizure by motion to quash the information, although it has been ruled
improper.1 23 Theoretically, there is good reason for this, since the prosecution may still proceed even if the search and seizure has been
ruled invalid, and the evidence suppressed. From a practical view,
however, we shall see that the fate of the case usually depends upon
the disposition of the motion to suppress the evidence.
Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion to Quash the Search Warrant
In all cases in the trial court, whether or not a search warrant is
involved, the search or seizure is usually attacked by a motion to suppress the evidence, a procedure that has developed in Florida without
help of either statute or rule of court. The practice probably stems
from the federal practice which is based upon Rule 41(e), Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Since no hard and fast rules have been
adopted in Florida, some features are not as yet clearly defined. A
121. Mitchell v. State, 60 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1952).
122. Davis v. State, 113 Fla. 713, 152 So. 6 (1934).
128. Johnson v. State, 157 Fla. 685, 27 So. 2d 276 (1946).
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few cases mention the question of time. In Robertson v. State12 4 it
was held that even though it is not indispensable to move before trial
for the suppression of the evidence, if no objection or motion is made
when the prosecution offers the evidence at the trial, the privilege is
waived. Where, during the trial, the jury was excused by the court
for the purpose of inquiry into the question of search and seizure, the
prosecution offered testimony to support legality of the search, and the
defense declined to offer testimony, it was held that the privilege was
25
waived.'
In cases involving a search warrant, an alleged defect in the affidavit, warrant, execution or return is often raised by motion to quash
one or more of these and is usually combined with the motion to suppress the evidence.126 Actually, the motion to suppress is probably
sufficient to raise all search questions in the trial court.
These motions are usually argued before the court prior to trial. If
the alleged defects in the affidavit, search warrant, execution or return are apparent on the face of the instruments or pleadings, the
questions may be disposed of without the taking of testimony. All
defects raised by the defendant by allegations of fact are resolved by
the taking of testimony. Almost all the questions raised in these motions are either questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact
and are therefore heard by the court either prior to trial or during trial
in the absence of the jury. 27 The better practice is to hear the motions
prior to trial, thus eliminating the necessity of excluding the jury for
long periods in the course of the trial. If the motions are denied, the
case proceeds to trial. If, however, the motion to suppress is granted,
the effect is to preclude the State's use of that evidence in the trial.
The State cannot appeal from this ruling 2 8 and typically announces a
nolle prosequi, because insufficient evidence usually remains. This is
often done even if the State possesses a confession by the defendant,
because the confession cannot be admitted without a corpus delicti
29
having been proved.1
Burden of Proof
In the hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant
has the burden of proof to show his standing to invoke the privilege
against unreasonable search and seizure. 130 If defendant succeeds in
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
180.

94 Fla. 770, 114 So. 534 (1927).
Fuller v. State, 159 Fla. 200, 31 So. 2d 259 (1947).
Hamelmann v. State, 113 So. 2d 394 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Mixon v. State, 54 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1951).
See FLA. STAT. §924.07 (1961).
Alexander v. State, 107 So. 2d 261 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
Mxon v. State, supra note 127.
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establishing this privilege, it is not clear in all instances whether
(1) the defendant carries the burden of proving its invalidity, or
(2) the State carries the burden to prove the validity of the search, or
(3) the court should make an independent determination similar to
determining the admissibility of the confession. Although there are
numerous reported cases in Florida mentioning motions to suppress
the evidence, little is said about the precise procedure or about burden
of proof.
Ordinarily the movant carries the burden of proof, favoring approach (1) above. The writer has personal knowledge that many
trial courts have followed this procedure, especially if the defendant
makes definite allegations of fact concerning a search warrant. However, it has been held that where the State relies on a search incident
to a valid arrest, the burden is upon the State to prove that the arrest
was actually valid.' 3 ' The basis given by the court was that "the arrest
cannot justify the search and in turn the search justify the arrest"
This would seem to favor (2) above. Occasionally, there has been
some reference that it is the court's province to determine the validity
of the search and "by exercising its powers and judicial discretion in
this regard.. ."132 This would seem to make (3) above available.
In practice there is little problem. The hearing is usually not so
formal as a trial and is not held in the presence of the jury. The testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the search is confined
to those witnesses having knowledge concerning those circumstances.
The witnesses may or may not be the same ones who testify at the
trial. The defense usually depends upon cross-examination of the
State witnesses, usually officers, who were present at the search, or
who made the arrest, if the search is alleged to have been incident to
a valid arrest. Sometimes the defendant will testify, confining his testimony to the search or arrest, so that he cannot be cross-examined
concerning incrimination in general.
EFFEcr OF F~mmAL DECisiONs ON FLoImA LAw

The law of search and seizure has developed in Florida simultaneously and almost identically with that of the federal courts. Florida
appellate courts have continually referred to rulings of the United
States Supreme Court on this subject, whether the reason given was
that Florida courts are bound to follow the United States Supreme
Court, or merely because the rulings of the nation's highest court were
considered sound by Florida courts. The fourth amendment and sec131. Urso v. State, 134 So. 2d 810, 813 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
132. Johnson v. State, supra note 123, at 698, 27 So. 2d at 282.
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tion 22 are practically identical, thus providing good reason why rulings on one have been considered in rulings on the other.
The Florida appellate courts have rendered conflicting opinions on
the question of the effect of rulings of the United States Supreme
Court upon Florida law. In 1921 the Florida Supreme Court recognized the fourteenth amendment as conferring privileges to citizens
which could not be abridged by the state.133 However, in later cases,
the court said that federal decisions are not binding on states, 134 that
the fourth amendment is not applicable to state criminal proceed35
ings.1
We have seen that when the United States Supreme Court established a new rule as to search of automobiles in the Carrollcase,13 6 the
Florida legislature adopted the ruling, thus removing any doubt about
what the law in Florida would be on that aspect of search and seizure
law.
Until recently, the question of federal effect was more one of speculation, because there was always little or no difference in any concept
of search and seizure law between federal and state courts. Indeed,
when Wharton, in one of his works on criminal evidence, criticized
state courts generally for laxity in protecting the rights of citizens from
invalid searches and seizures by admitting evidence illegally seized,
the Florida Supreme Court justifiably took issue: 137
Mr. Wharton's inference, that state courts are less mindful of
constitutional quarantees than the federal courts, seems a
rather severe criticism of state tribunals of justice, but with respect to the decisions of this court it is unwarranted.
For the first time, however, a possible difference exists between an
established concept in Florida law and a new ruling by the United
States Supreme Court. The Jones case of the United States and the
Leveson case of Florida have been already discussed fully in the section on standing of defendant to invoke the constitutional privilege.
The conclusion there was that the United States Supreme Court had
established new rules for determining the standing of the defendant
and that in the Leveson case, the Florida Supreme Court left open the
question of whether Florida must follow the ruling of the Jones case.
Until recently the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that its exclusionary rule only applied to federal courts. The so-called
188.
184.
135.
186.
187.

Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 355, 91 So. 876 (1921).
Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484 (1934).
Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1953).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Hart v. State, 89 Fla. 202, 208, 108 So. 633, 6835 (1925).
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exclusionary rule was first laid down in Weeks v. United States.13 8 The
court had formerly approved the rule that in the trial of a criminal
cause, relevant evidence would be admitted, and that the manner of
its obtaining was purely a collateral issue. In the Weeks case, however, it was held (1) that evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment cannot be used in criminal prosecutions in federal courts
and (2) that the ruling applied only to federal prosecutions. Thus, in
the very inception of the federal exclusionary rule, the Court left the
states with complete control over the admissibility of such evidence.
As late as 1960 the Court refused to force the rule upon the states. 139
In 1961, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court perhaps
imposed the exclusionary rule upon the states. However, the imposition is more apparent than real. In Mapp v. Ohio140 the Court reversed a criminal conviction in Ohio, purportedly upon the basis that
evidence used against defendant had been obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment as read into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lawyers and law review commentators have
hailed this case as establishing a new rule and a new precedent. A
point overlooked is that, of the majority of five Justices who reversed
the conviction, only four did so on this premise. The fifth Justice, in
a special concurring opinion, expressly did not join in the ruling on
that basis, but only because he was of the opinion that the Ohio statute
upon which the prosecution was based was unconstitutional. What
kind of a precedent can be set by four Justices of a court composed of
nine Justices?
Even if the ruling in the Mapp case should be followed by later
rulings of a majority of the court, how far will the application be carried? Will the state courts be forced to adhere to the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court on all aspects of the many-faceted subject of search and seizure? This might prove confusing, since many
rulings in federal courts are made in relation to various federal statutes
and court rules implementing the fourth amendment, many of which
either differ from, or have no counterpart in, state statutes or rules.
Will all state statutes and rules in conflict with rulings of the federal
courts be made ineffective? Will state officers and courts have to comply with federal statutes and rules? Such happenings are doubtful,
but these questions are far from settled at this time.
In Florida the courts are maintaining a waiting attitude. Cases no
doubt will be decided as far as possible without having to express
either agreement or conflict with federal decisions. This was indicated in the ruling by the Supreme Court of Florida in the Leveson
188. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
139. Elkins v. United States, 864 U.S. 206 (1960).
140. 867 U.S. 648 (1961).
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case, where the court reached its decision on the circumstances of the
particular case.
CONCLUSION

The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of the Florida Supreme Court to prohibit the use of evidence obtained in contravention of the fourth amendment and section 22 came approximately
one hundred 'twenty-five years, and seventy-five years, respectively,
after the adoption of those provisions. The courts thereafter became
involved in the laying down of rules, with exception and modification,
for the application of the main rule, sometimes referred to as the exclusionary rule. This process is still going on today, almost entirely by
judicial decisions, very similarly to the development of the common
law. All of the rules presently being applied have been developed
during the brief span of forty years. Development has been so gradual that the courts themselves do not seem to realize that they have
even set down rules. At first inspection these rules, with their exceptions and modifications, seem confusing. Lawyers and even the courts
sometimes misunderstand their application. Nevertheless, in order to
intelligently consider the various decisions which comprise the law on
search and seizure, it is necessary to group them under some designation.
A. Type of premises searched
1. Dwelling
2. Other fixed premises
3. Motor vehicles
4. Person
B. Type of Search
1. By search warrant
2. Incident to arrest
3. Incident to exercise of state regulatory power
4. With consent
5. When defendant is without standing to protest
C. Type of articles seized
1. Articles illegal in themselves (contraband)
2. Other
Each of the different factors in Type A are affected by one or more
of Type B factors, and often both are to some extent affected by Type
C. In some cases other constitutional and statutory rights also come
into play. It is well for lawyers and the courts to be careful in analyzing each set of circumstances before reaching a hasty conclusion based
on one seemingly outstanding feature of a set of circumstances.
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When the courts first adopted the policy of excluding evidence
which the court felt had been gained illegally, it appeared for awhile
as though it was going to be virtually impossible for law enforcement
officers to make valid searches and seizures. Practically all court decisions seemed to be in favor of the defense and against the prosecution. In time, however, the trend began to reverse. The courts began
to distinguish between various sets of circumstances. More emphasis
began to be placed upon the phrase "unreasonable seizures and
searches" in the constitutional provision.
The problem faced by the courts is that of balancing two conflicting evils, (1) the evil of crime and (2) the evil of violation of the
rights of the citizen to be free from undue harassment by the mighty
power of government. A balance must be drawn. Experience has
shown that this balance can be maintained only through the courts.
Many arguments can validly be presented to show why the courts
should retreat altogether from the exclusionary rule.
1. Strict application of the rule increases the already difficult problem of enforcement of the laws, particularly since the advent of wellfinanced organized crime. The stock answer to this argument is that
all that is needed is for law enforcement officers to observe the rules of
search and seizure, so that evidence will be seized legally, and the
laws will still be effectively enforced. This would be a good answer
except for the fact that the law on search and seizure is so complicated
that the average lawyer, and even judges, would have difficulty in
conducting a valid search and seizure on short notice. How can law
enforcement officers be expected to do so under our present system of
treating such officers practically as unskilled labor, rather than professional men with professional training and compensation?
2. The exclusionary rule breeds corruption of law enforcement officers in two ways. In the first place, officers see persons engaged in
full-time gambling, moonshine or other illegal business, apparently
with a large income, and apparently with impunity. Some illegal
operators in Florida have been arrested more than twenty times without having one conviction on their record because of court rulings on
search and seizure. Temptation becomes stronger to participate at
least by "cooperation." Conscience can be salved by telling himself
that the illegal activities will go on regardless of what he does about it.
Secondly, once an officer decides to go along with the lawbreakers, the
way is made easier by the search and seizure laws. The officer can
occasionally make an arrest, even of a friend, and will receive credit
for enforcing the law, but by conveniently making a mistake in procedure, can help the arrested ones go free. The court then is blamed
for effecting the release of the lawbreakers on a "technicality," as the
layman or newspaper reporter sees it.
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3. The exclusionary rule promotes a distrust by laymen toward the
law and the courts. This is a serious criticism, since a belief in the law
and the courts is an essential ingredient of our governmental system.
It is very difficult to explain search and seizure law to laymen, primarily because of its complexity. A prominent Florida newspaperman
once wrote that the apparent reason for the exclusionary rule was that
it helped carry out the axiom that it is better that ten guilty men go
free than that one innocent person be convicted. This, of course, is
not the reason at all, as we have seen.
4. The rule breeds contempt in the criminal for the law. Many
guilty persons freed by the court because their constitutional rights
have been violated do not themselves understand the reason, or they
do not appreciate the fact that the court is merely ensuring that everyone's rights are protected. Sometimes he thinks he has been acquitted because he had a very sharp lawyer. Sometimes he thinks he or
his friends have "fixed" a case. Indeed, the defendant may even have
paid a friend a large amount to "influence" an officer, prosecutor or
even the court, of which those supposed to be influenced may never
even be aware, the recipient well knowing that the outcome of the
case vill be favorable to the defendant in any event.
All of these criticisms seem to be strong indictments of our present
procedure. Opposed to these and other criticisms is only one argument. That is the right of the individual citizens to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects from the power of their government, except by due process. The courts have held that this right
outweighs all the numerous arguments in favor of law enforcement by
any means, and rightly so. This is a right insisted upon by the founders of our country. They knew all too well by experience what it
meant not to possess that right. During the years immediately preceding independence, these men were harassed, and their homes and
papers searched, for committing no wrong but disagreement with their
government politically.
We place great pride and faith in our Constitution and our constitutional rights, often taken for granted. Many other countries of the
world also have constitutions. This does not prevent the government
in many "constitutional" countries from oppressing the people and depriving them of their rights. The place given to the judiciary in our
Government, and the position taken by our judiciary on the question of
governmental power versus constitutional rights is a strong reason for
the success of our system and the failure of so many others.
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This writer is in favor of strong, aggressive law enforcement, but
not without restraint. Words spoken several hundred years ago in our
Anglo-Saxon past still have an appealing ring:' 4 '
The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces
of the crown; it may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the king may not enter, and all his forces dare not cross the
threshold of the ruined tenement.

141. Cooper v. State, 106 Fla. 254, 256, 143 So. 217 (1932) (quoting Lord
Chatham).
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